This paper analyzes endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Individuals differ in policy preferences and decide either to take part in lobbying activities or not. They are assumed to be group rule-utilitarian such that they follow the rule that, if followed by everyone else in their special interest group, would maximize their group's aggregate welfare. Once formed, lobbies make contributions to the incumbent government in exchange for a policy favor as in a common-agency model. I show the existence of equilibrium with two organized lobbies. Individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to join lobbying activities. Therefore, the lobbyists are rather extremists than moderates. However, the competition between those extreme lobbies results in a more moderate policy outcome relative to that initially preferred by the biased government. Lobbies therefore guard against extremism, while acting as moderators of the government's preferences.
Introduction
Lobbying is a highly controversial phenomenon, often seen in a negative light by the public at large. There has been, however, an argument put forward in support of lobbying. According to this view, lobbying permits opposing interests to battle preventing extremism (see DeKieffer 2007 ) . In other words, the Madisonian view of politics -in which factions compete with each other precluding tyranny -works for lobbies too. The only difference is that disputes are settled by interests groups fighting each other in the post-election stage rather than by elections. The present paper aims to contribute to this line of thinking. I analyze a model of endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Individuals differ in policy preferences and decide either to join a lobby that represents their special interest group (a pro-policy lobby or an anti-policy lobby) or not to take part in lobbying activities. The incumbent government cares about policy outcomes and lobbies' contribution payments. Once formed, lobbies make contributions to the government in exchange for a policy favor as in a common-agency model of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) , adapted to lobbying by Grossman and Helpman (1994) .
I follow a group-rule utilitarian approach to the individuals' coordination problem, inspired by Harsanyi (1980) . According to this approach, individuals are assumed to be group rule-utilitarian such that they follow the rule that, if followed by everyone else in their special interest group, would maximize their group's aggregate welfare from the policy outcome. I show the existence of equilibrium with two organized lobbies. Individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to be involved in lobbying activities. In equilibrium, each lobby is characterized by a threshold level of preferences such that all individuals with more pro-policy views (for the pro-policy lobby) or more anti-policy views (for the anti-policy lobby) participate in lobbying activities. This is in line with the results of Glazer and Gradstein (2005) and McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) that extremists want to contribute the most.
While the lobby members are rather extremists than moderates, the competition between the lobbies moderates the government's preferences. In particular, it shifts the final policy outcome in favor of individuals who are initially disadvantaged by the government. Intuitively, consider the case of a government biased in favor of high policy levels. Individuals with preferences similar to the government's have less stake in the policy, since they are initially favored by the government's preferred policy. Anti-policy individuals, however, are disadvantaged by the government's preferences. Owing to the concavity of preferences, anti-policy individuals gain more than pro-policy individuals from the same (in absolute value) policy change.
1 Therefore, they are willing to contribute more to the government for a policy change. As a result, under a government biased in favor of high policy levels, the anti-policy lobby is more numerous and contributes more than the pro-policy lobby. The equilibrium policy level is more moderate than the one preferred by the biased government prior to lobbying,
First Stage: Lobby Formation
Given the policy setting, it is reasonable to focus on the case in which two lobbies can be formed: a lobby of anti-policy individuals, given by a set ⊂ [0, ), and a lobby of pro-policy individuals, given by a set ⊂ ( , 1]. If the individuals cared only about their net benefit from lobbying then in this setting with a continuum of individuals and costly lobbying, there would be no equilibrium in which a positive fraction of individuals would participate in lobbying activities. I assume however that the individuals are group rule-utilitarian in the following sense. Each individual has a rule that he understands he has to follow, and derives utility from acting according to this rule. This is the rule that, if followed by every other individual from the same special interest group, would maximize this group's aggregate utility from the policy outcome . The aggregate utility of anti-policy individuals from the policy outcome is equal to
while that of pro-policy individuals is equal to
Then an individual faces the following trade-off when deciding on whether to participate in lobbying activities. On the one hand, he realizes that given a continuum of individuals, his participation would not affect the policy outcome but would give him utility from acting according to the rule. On the other hand, shirking would save him a contribution fee in case the rule specifies that he should participate in lobbying. In what follows, the utility from following the rule is assumed to be sufficiently high such that it exceeds the highest possible contribution fee in each lobby. 4 Then individuals have no incentive to shirk and so follow the rule that, if followed by every other individual from the same special interest group, would maximize the group's aggregate utility from the policy outcome. 5 Let each special interest group's rule be a critical policy threshold such that an individual with more extreme policy preferences should take part in lobbying while an individual with more moderate policy preferences should not. Formally, I denote by ∈ [0, ] the critical policy threshold for anti-policy individuals with < . Their rule specifies that anti-policy individuals with ideal policies lower than should enter lobby while those with ideal policies higher than should not. Likewise, I denote by ∈ [ , 1] the critical policy threshold for pro-policy individuals with > . Their rule indicates that pro-policy individuals with preferred policies higher than should enter lobby while those with ideal policies lower than should not. The rule * that maximizes the aggregate utility of anti-policy individuals from the policy outcome is the one that each anti-policy individual < understands he should follow. Likewise, the rule * that maximizes the aggregate utility of pro-policy individuals from the policy outcome is the one that each pro-policy individual > reasons he should follow.
Second Stage: Contribution Game
I focus on lobbying activities in the context of the common-agency model of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) , adapted to lobbying by Grossman and Helpman (1994) . In this approach, lobbying is modeled as a "menu auction", where lobbies confront government with contribution schedules that map any possible policy into a contribution payment.
First, each lobby ∈ { , }, noncooperatively and simultaneously, presents its common agent, the government, with a contribution schedule ( ), giving a binding promise of payment conditional on a chosen policy level . 6 Following the literature cited in the previous paragraph, I concentrate on (globally) truthful contribution schedules that satisfy
where (⋅) denotes lobby 's gross objective function and is a constant chosen optimally by lobby . So lobbies reveal their true preferences: they contribute to the government the maximum amount that they are willing to exchange for the government's decision. I follow the existing literature (e. g., Drazen, Limão, and Stratmann 2007; Grossman and Helpman 1994; Mitra 1999 ) and assume that the objective of lobby is to maximize the net aggregate utility of its members, namely
Second, the government sets to maximize its utility:
Equilibrium of the game is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the contribution schedules, the chosen policy and the lobbies' compositions. In the following section, the game is analyzed backwards. First, I solve for the policy level * and lobbies contributions * and * . Second, I find the critical policy thresholds * and * that characterize the rules followed by the anti-policy and pro-policy individuals, respectively.
Common-Agency Lobbying
Suppose that two lobbies and have been formed. To derive equilibrium in truthful strategies, the following lemma is used. (See Bernheim and Whinston 1986; Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman 1997 ; for a proof.)
Lemma 1
The equilibrium policy is Pareto optimal in the bilateral relation between the government and each lobby.
Therefore, the equilibrium policy maximizes the sum of the lobbies' net objective functions
and the government's objective (1). This sum equals
Maximizing eq. (2) yields the equilibrium policy level * : * = arg max
To find the contribution levels in the equilibrium, define to be the policy that would emerge if the contribution offered by lobby were zero, , ∈ { , }, ≠ . So, = arg max
= arg max
In other words, is the policy that would emerge if lobby were not formed. Lobby will raise the constant in its truthful contribution schedule to the point where the government is just indifferent between choosing policy and choosing the equilibrium policy * , i. e.,
. Now one can solve for the lobbies' contributions in equilibrium. The following proposition summarizes the results of the lobbies' common-agency contribution game. Proofs of this and other results are delegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium in truthful strategies such that the equilibrium policy level is given by * = arg max
The lobbies' equilibrium contributions are equal to * ≡ (
If there is just one organized lobby, the government derives exactly the same utility as it would have achieved without any contribution. Thus, a lobby that faces no competition captures the entire surplus from lobbying activities. If two lobbies compete for the final policy, the government captures some surplus from lobbying activities, and each lobby pays according to the political strength of its rival.
The lobby formation stage of the game is analyzed in the following section.
Lobby Formation
The individuals follow the threshold rules ∈ [0, ] and ∈ [ , 1] that specify that an anti-policy individual with bliss point should enter lobby if < and should not take part in lobbying otherwise, while a pro-policy individual should enter lobby if > and should not take part in lobbying otherwise.
Once formed, the lobbies care about the aggregate utility of their members. Therefore, their gross objective functions read
In what follows, for ease of exposition and analysis, is assumed to be distributed uniformly with density 1,
Then the lobbies' gross objective functions amount to
The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium policy level * (⋅) and the lobbies' equilibrium contributions in the case of two organized lobbies and .
Lemma 2
Given threshold rules and , the equilibrium policy level with two organized lobbies and is equal to
. The lobbies' equilibrium contributions in the case of two organized lobbies and are equal to * ( , ) =
. In what follows, I show the existence of nonempty organized lobbies and , i. e., I find * and * that maximize the aggregate utilities of the corresponding special interest groups from the policy outcome.
Equilibrium
The following proposition establishes the existence of equilibrium with two organized lobbies.
Proposition 2
Given the government's preferred policy ∈ [0, 1], there exist the following equilibrium with two nonempty lobbies and , equilibrium policy level * and equilibrium contributions * and * :
-for ∈ [0,
.
According to Proposition 2, for the government's preferred policy ∈ [0,
], all anti-policy individuals join the anti-policy lobby in equilibrium but only a fraction of pro-policy individuals join the pro-policy lobby . In particular, only individuals with preferred policies higher than 2 + − √3 + 2 enter lobby . For the government's preferred policy ∈ ( , 1], all pro-policy individuals join the pro-policy lobby in equilibrium but only a fraction of anti-policy individuals participate in lobbying. Specifically, only individuals with preferred policies lower than −2 + + √5 − 2 join lobby . These results suggest that lobbyists are rather extremists than moderates. In other words, some individuals with moderate preferences do not lobby in equilibrium. Those are members of a larger special interest group (recall that all members of a smaller special interest group lobby in equilibrium). Intuitively, consider members of a smaller special interest group. They follow the rule that maximizes the group's aggregate utility from the policy outcome and so end up including everyone in the lobby in order to represent the interests of every single member. In turn, members of the larger special interest group realize that in order to maximize their group's aggregate utility given lobbying efforts of the smaller group and the government's biased position, their lobby should advocate quite an extreme policy and so should include extremists. Including moderates into the lobby would moderate its objective, which would result in a more moderate policy outcome and so in a lower aggregate utility of the group's members. Therefore, the moderate members of the larger special interest group do not join lobbying activities.
The result that some moderates do not lobby in equilibrium arises due to heterogeneity of preferences. The moderates' interests are represented to some extent by the government that advocates a relatively moderate (though possibly biased) policy. Representing their interests also through lobbying would moderate the corresponding lobby. This would lead to a more moderate outcome, which would definitely benefit those moderates but not their special interest group. Since the individuals are group-rule utilitarian, they follow the rule that maximizes the group's aggregate utility from the policy outcome and so leave the moderates aside. It is important to point out that this intuition applies to a larger group whose members have more heterogeneous preferences which range from quite extreme to rather moderate. A smaller group is formed by more homogeneous individuals with rather extreme preferences and so is better off including every member in lobbying activities.
It is important to emphasize that the rule each special interest group follows is assumed to take the form of a policy threshold. Consider the anti-policy group, for example. An anti-policy individual joins the corresponding lobbying group if his ideal policy lies in the interval [0, ) where is determined by the rule. Alternatively, a rule might determine an interval [ , ) such that ∈ [0, ). In Appendix D, I show that given the rules [ , * ) and ( * , 1] of the anti-policy and pro-policy groups, the anti-policy group's aggregate utility from the policy outcome is maximized at = 0. Consider next the pro-policy group. Its rule determines the interval ( , 1] such that a pro-policy individual participates in lobbying if his ideal policy is in this interval. A rule might instead determine an interval ( , ] such that ∈ ( , 1]. I prove in Appendix D that given the rules [0, * ) and
, the pro-policy group's aggregate utility from the policy outcome is maximized at = 1. Therefore, even if the rules took form of intervals [ , ) and ( , ], the lobby composition, policy level and contributions described in Proposition 2 would still form equilibrium of the game.
The following corollary provides comparative statics results.
Corollary 1
The more biased the government in favor of high policy levels, the more numerous the anti-policy lobby and the less numerous the pro-policy lobby : * > 0,
The more biased the government in favor of high policy levels, the higher the policy level * implemented in equilibrium, the larger the anti-policy lobby contributions * and the lower the pro-policy lobby contributions
When the government is biased in favor of low policy levels, ∈ [0, 1 2 ), the pro-policy lobby is more numerous and contributes more than the anti-policy lobby . The equilibrium policy level favors pro-policy individuals, i. e., it is higher than the government's preferred level (the policy level that would emerge without lobbying).
When the government is biased in favor of high policy levels, ∈ ( , 1], the pro-policy lobby is less numerous and contributes less than the anti-policy lobby . The equilibrium policy level favors anti-policy individuals, i. e., it is lower than that preferred by the government.
In case of the unbiased government, = 1 2
, the lobbies are of the same size and contribute the same amount to the government. Lobbying does not affect the policy outcome, i. e., the equilibrium policy level is equal to that preferred by the government.
Thus, lobbying somewhat moderates the government's preferences. The implemented policy favors those individuals who are initially disadvantaged by the government's preferred policy. Consider a biased government (which is in favor of either low or high policy levels). Then individuals whose preferences differ considerably from the government's have more stake in the policy than individuals with preferences similar to the government's. In other words, owing to the concavity of preferences, "disadvantaged" individuals are willing to pay more than "favored" individuals for the same (in absolute value) policy change. As a result, the lobby of "disadvantaged" individuals is more numerous and contributes more than the lobby of initially "favored" individuals. And the final policy becomes less extreme and goes in favor of the lobby with higher relative political strength, i. e., the lobby of individuals who are initially disadvantaged by the government's preferred policy. It is important to emphasize that even though those individuals influence the final policy more than the advantaged group, they have to pay for it. Indeed, in equilibrium, the disadvantaged group's contributions are higher than those of the advantaged group.
When the government is unbiased, lobbying does not affect the policy outcome. In this case the lobbies "neutralize" one another, so that in equilibrium 's bids for a higher policy level are matched by 's bids for a lower policy level, and political competition results in an unbiased policy outcome. Nonetheless, each lobby has to make a positive contribution in order to induce the government to choose this outcome rather than one that would be worse from that lobby's perspective.
I show in Appendix F that the government utility in equilibrium is non-negative, increases in for ∈ [0,
and decreases in for ∈ (
, 1]. If there were no lobbies formed, then the government would implement its preferred policy and get zero utility. It implies that in equilibrium, the government extracts rents from competing lobbies. Moreover, the less biased the government, the more rents it extracts. The unbiased government, =
, extracts the most rents. Intuitively, in this case, the lobbies neutralize each other, the government implements its preferred policy and so faces no utility loss. Moreover, none of the special interest groups has a policy advantage and so both lobbies have to contribute considerably to match each other's contributions. Note that the equilibrium policy level under a government biased in favor of high policy levels is higher than that under a government biased in favor of low policy levels, with or without lobbying. Therefore, the pro-policy individuals would prefer a government biased in favor of high policy levels to that biased in favor of low policy levels in spite of the fact that under the latter they could influence the final policy in their favor by lobbying. In turn, the anti-policy individuals would prefer a government biased in favor of low policy levels, even though they could lobby more successfully under a government biased in favor of high policy levels.
Discussion
My model of lobby formation predicts that lobbying over a particular policy issue moderates policy outcomes. This is in line with various facts about lobby impacts on policymaking. For example, in 2000, President Clinton signed the China Trade Bill which extended permanent trade relations with mainland China. Supporters of the bill (such as the US Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable) argued that the bill would provide ample business opportunities and so took a lot of lobbying efforts to get it signed. Opponents of the bill (such as labor unions and environmental groups) opposed the bill because of China's human rights and labor standards issues. They also believed that it would threaten the U.S. labor market because of job losses. The opponents' concerns were addressed by a number of provisions, which led to a compromise towards a more moderate policy outcome relative to the initial pro-bill position of the Clinton administration.
7 Another example is the California Clean Energy and Pollution Reduction Act signed into law in 2015. The bill supporters (such as climate change groups and some Silicon Valley companies) advocated establishing new clean energy and greenhouse gas reduction goals. The initial proposal called for a 50 % reduction in gasoline use by 2030. The opponents (petroleum companies and drivers associations) argued that the bill offered no specific policy plans and could lead to gas rationing, driving restricting and fuel prices rising. They launched a massive lobbying campaign which resulted in the bill being amended and the petroleum provisions being dropped. Therefore, their lobbying efforts moderated the policy outcome to some extent.
8
It is important to emphasize, however, that in the present model the individuals differ only in their policy preferences but not in their financial endowments. In other words, all individuals can pay their corresponding contribution fees. This assumption is crucial for my results. Intuitively, in the case of financial constraints, the individuals would not be able to make the contribution payments and so would not be able to offset the government's bias. Then the moderating effect of lobbying would not arise. One can think of my setting as an "equal opportunity" environment in which the special interest groups face no or insignificant financial constraints.
The other important assumption of my model is that of no contribution caps (for models of contribution caps, see Cotton 2012; Dahm and Porteiro 2008; Drazen, Limão, and Stratmann 2007 ) . Contribution limits would somewhat offset the moderating effect of lobbying in my model. Intuitively, consider a government biased in favor of low policy levels. In case of no contribution caps, the pro-policy lobby contributes more than the anti-policy lobby and so is able to "convince" the government to implement a less biased policy, which gives rise to the moderating effect. Suppose next that contribution limits apply and that the contribution cap falls between the equilibrium contributions of two lobbies. In this case, the pro-policy lobby would contribute the amount equal to the contribution cap while the anti-policy lobby would somewhat adjust its contribution downwards. Still, due to the concave utilities, the pro-policy lobby adjustment would exceed that of the anti-policy lobby. Therefore, the final policy would not be as moderate as in the case of no contribution limits. It implies that in my model, the contribution limits lead to less moderate outcomes and so partially neutralize the guarding effect of lobbying. It is important to stress that this is due to the "equal opportunity" nature of my framework in which individuals have the same financial endowments. In the case of endowment heterogeneity, the introduction of contribution caps might amplify the guarding effect of lobbying.
Note also that the quantitative results of my model depend on the way the anti-and pro-policy special interest groups are defined (with respect to the government's preferred policy ). Intuitively, this threshold divides individuals in two groups: those who prefer a policy lower than the government's and those who prefer a policy higher than the government's. It is therefore a natural critical point to define the special interest groups with divergent preferences. Alternatively, the interest groups could be defined by some other threshold (e. g., a median policy ) or by a pair of thresholds and ( < ) such that individuals with ideal policies lower than belong to the anti-policy special interest group while individuals with ideal policies higher than belong to the pro-policy special interest group. Under those alternative definitions of interest groups, the main intuition for my results would still prevail. So the qualitative results of my model would hold unless the thresholds and were so extreme that the corner solutions arose in equilibrium, i. e., * = and * = . In this case, the results about moderating effects of lobbying would depend on the size of special interest groups, and 1 − .
Conclusion
The present paper studies the impact of lobbying on government decision-making. I develop a model of endogenous lobby formation, which predicts that individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to participate in lobbying. It follows that the lobbyists are rather extremists than moderates. However, the competition between the lobbies benefits the public at large resulting in a less extreme policy outcome relative to that initially preferred by the government. I show that lobbying somewhat moderates the government's preferences. The final policy under lobbying favors individuals who are initially disadvantaged by the government's preferred policy. Indeed, under a government biased in favor of high policy levels, the final policy outcome is somewhat more moderate than that initially preferred by the biased policymakers. Under a government biased in favor of low policy levels, lobbying moderates the final policy in favor of pro-policy individuals. In the case of an unbiased government, lobbying does not affect the final policy, and political competition results in an unbiased outcome. However, each lobby has to contribute the same amount to the government to maintain this policy level. My paper therefore presents a formal argument in support of lobbying as a guard against extremism. According to my results, the competition between extreme special interests results in a quite moderate policy outcome, which would not be achieved with no lobbies around. Nevertheless, this paper constitutes a partial attempt to study individual lobbying behavior and focuses on a specific form of coordination among citizens. It might be interesting to consider different coordination mechanisms that citizens use to overcome the freeriding problem. 9 It might also be interesting to consider a nonsymmetric distribution of preferences. In this case, I expect that the qualitative results presented above will still hold (except, probably, those for the case of an unbiased government).
Proof of Proposition 1
The lobbies' truthful contribution schedules are
The constants and in the lobbies' truthful contribution schedules satisfy
Plugging eq. (4) into eq. (5) yields
where the first line is lobby 's equilibrium contribution * , and the second line is lobby 's equilibrium contribution * . ■
Proof of Lemma 2
The equilibrium policy level is equal to * = arg max
The first-order condition of this maximization problem amounts to
The second-order condition is satisfied and so * ( , ) = 1
If lobby did not contribute to the government, the following policy would emerge:
The first-order condition is given by
The second-order condition is satisfied and therefore
Likewise, if lobby did not contribute then the government would choose the following policy:
The first-order condition amounts to
The second-order condition is satisfied and so
According to Proposition 1, the lobbies' equilibrium contributions are equal to * ≡ (
Proof of Proposition 2
The threshold rule * ∈ [0, ] maximizes the aggregate utility of anti-policy individuals from the policy outcome * given by
Plugging in the expression for * ( , ) from Lemma 2 yields
The first derivative of eq. (6) with respect to is equal to
The first derivative (7) is strictly positive for all ∈ [0, ] only when 0 < ≤ 1 2 and ≤ < √1 − 2 + . In this case, = maximizes eq. (6) . The first derivative (7) is never strictly negative for all ∈ [0, ]. The first derivative (7) equals zero in the following cases:
= 0 when = 0 and 0 ≤ ≤ 1, = when 0 < ≤ 
. Evaluating it at the critical points yields that the second-order condition holds for = , = −2 + √5 + 2 − 4 + and = −1 + √ 3. Therefore, the argmax of eq. (6) is as follows. For = 0, = 0 for all
, 1), = −2 + √5 + 2 − 4 + for all ∈ [ , 1]. For = 1, = −1 + √ 3 for = 1. The threshold rule * ∈ [ , 1] maximizes the aggregate utility of pro-policy individuals from the policy outcome * given by
The first derivative of eq. (8) with respect to is equal to
The first derivative (9) is never strictly positive for all ∈ [ , 1]. The first derivative (9) is strictly negative for all ∈ [ , 1] only when 
Evaluating it at the critical points yields that the second-order condition holds for = 2 − √ 3 and = 2 + − √3 + 4 − 2 . Thus, the argmax of eq. (8) is as follows. For = 0, = 2 − √ 3 for = 0. For ∈ (0,
, 1), , 1], * = −2 + + √5 − 2 and * = . Plugging * and * into * ( , ), * ( , ) and * ( , ) in Lemma 2 yields the equilibrium policy level * and the equilibrium contributions * and * . In particular, for ∈ [0, . (1 − 3 ) for ∈ (
Rules Characterized by Two Thresholds
which is an increasing function of ∈ ( * , 1]. It implies that the pro-policy group's aggregate utility from the policy outcome is maximized at = 1.
These derivatives are such that *
